By reframing behavioural radicalisation as predatory aggression, this chapter introduces an analytical framework applicable across diverse contexts – from domestic terrorism to ethnic strife. Unlike bargaining aggression, which seeks negotiated gains, or reactive aggression, which is defensive, predatory aggression is driven by the intrinsic aim of eliminating or depowering perceived adversaries. This perspective clarifies why radicalised individuals are often viewed as “psychotic,” linking this perception to a psychological inversion of costs and benefits where harm to others becomes personally rewarding. By identifying envy and hatred as central emotions, the chapter advances a functional approach to the study of radicalisation. Through its application to ethnic violence, this perspective illuminates how predatory aggression shapes collective conflicts, offering a more precise conceptual boundary for behavioural radicalisation across different contexts.

Models of radicalization have typically placed grievances at the heart of radicalization. In contrast, we argue that viewing the radicalizing agent as decidedly proactive, and less reactive, better accounts for the available data. At the core of our radicalization model is the functional structure of envy. The operative properties of the emotion align with essential and conspicuous features of the radicalization process: a motivation to monitor social differentials, an identification of sources of postulated welfare costs, an impulse to eliminate or depower purported competitors, an attempt to diffuse responsibility for one’s aggressive actions, and the rejoicing at the envied agent’s misfortune. Two of those operative properties are particularly important for our understanding of radicalization. Envy motivates the neutralization of competitors when responsibility for welfare costs is not objectively attributable to others’ wrongdoing toward the party who feels injured. The “process of typification” serves as a means to diffuse responsibility. It extends the reach of individual concerns by downplaying the particulars of the personal situation motivating the envious agent while evoking universally shared interaction templates (e.g., humiliation, injustice) to appeal to a broader audience.

Terrorism continues to be an enigmatic and contested concept, lacking a universally accepted definition despite extensive scholarly debate. Lay intuitions, however, demonstrate a notable convergence in identifying acts as “terrorism” when specific situational features are present, such as indiscriminate violence and out-group perpetration. These features elicit predictable and robust precautionary responses, raising the question: Is there a unified and parsimonious explanation for these phenomena? It is hypothesized that a situational template exists in the human mind, the coalitional predation template (CPT), which evolved not to detect modern-day terrorism, per se, but to identify and respond to situations of predatory coalitional conflict. The paper examines the potential cues and mechanisms that constitute the psychological systems activated by such threats, suggesting that matching the input cues of the CPT triggers well-documented precautionary responses to terrorism. However, this cue-based system may not align neatly with contemporary threats, leading to disproportionate responses to some threats while underestimating others. The model also posits that interpretations of violence can vary due to incomplete cues and the social position of the evaluator, leading to public disagreements and inconsistencies in defining terrorism. Consequently, arriving at an unambiguous and widely accepted definition of terrorism may not be possible. The model presented may account for a range of phenomena, including the inclination towards attributing mental illness to particular violent incidents and the uncanny surface similarities between terrorism and war crimes. The findings have significant implications for both the theoretical understanding of terrorism and practical policy responses.

Impulsivity is recognized as a significant radicalization risk factor, yet its underlying mechanisms remain unclear. Previous research suggests that impulsive actions are emotionally driven. If so, the recently proposed envy-as-radicalization model may clarify this relationship, providing insights into radicalized individuals’ dramatic cognitive and behavioral transformations. The current study hypothesizes that envy mediates the relationship between impulsivity and radicalization, a connection not previously tested. Data from 649 participants measured dispositional and situational envy, impulsivity (Negative Emotional Urgency, Positive Emotional Urgency, and Lack of Premeditation), and radicalization (Extremist Attitudes, Endorsement of Political Violence). Results indicate that impulsivity and envy positively correlate with Extremist Attitudes and support for Political Violence. Controlling for Negative and Positive Urgency, Lack of Premeditation ceased to predict radicalization. Envy mediated the relationship between Negative Urgency and radicalization. This relationship suggests an impulsive-envious pathway to aggression, where neutralizing perceived social competitors takes precedence over other strategies, such as competition, submission, or avoidance. Positive Urgency followed Dispositional Envy in the model, potentially because positive emotions like schadenfreude reinforce further aggression. The study provides new insights into the roles of impulsivity and envy in radicalization and recommends investigating their relationship with criminality in future research, particularly among high-risk populations.

In the study of the process of radicalization, precedence has been given to answering ‘how’ questions over the exact qualification of the concept of radicalization itself. What does it mean to be radicalized? What are the cognitive entailments of such state? What are the features that make radicalization recognizable? We rely on a game theoretic model to characterize the essence of what it is to be radicalized. Our model of the radicalized agent’s rational behavior elucidates his construal of typical social transactions. We further propose that the rationality of the radicalized mind entails a cognitive calibration specifying a modality of thought we call the R.A.S.H. mentality. It incorporates a particular risk preference (that action is always optimal) and attitude (that one’s temerity calls for requital) which are both essential aspects of the radicalized mind. The R.A.S.H. mentality throw in a new light core findings of the radicalization literature.

The use of social network analysis (SNA) during the War on Terror has been a topic of significant political and academic discourse. SNA is an empirical method that graphically and mathematically represents interactions or relationships between nodes (eg, individuals, organizations) and the ties that connect them. The nature and degree of interdependence among nodes are believed to provide insights into the relationships and behaviour of members within a social network. The scarcity of precise and comprehensive data on the structure, functioning, and activities of terrorist groups has prompted some states to incorporate SNA into their intelligence efforts and rely on its data for counterterrorism activities, including lethal operations. However, the compatibility of SNA with international law remains underexplored. In this article, we adopt a legal-empirical approach to elucidate SNA in accessible terms and examine the challenges it presents for international law. We contend that SNA is fundamentally incompatible with international humanitarian law (IHL) targeting rules, as the data it provides do not pertain to legally relevant criteria. Nevertheless, SNA offers valuable insights for IHL by illuminating intra-group dynamics to facilitate conflict classification, identifying legally relevant characteristics in armed groups’ internal networks, and determining the strength of relations between armed factions. Our findings underscore the importance of a nuanced understanding of SNA’s applications and limitations in the context of international law.

Determining the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures is a considerable challenge. Despite calls for evidence-based policymaking and improved assessments, counterterrorism research has progressed slowly. Previous discussions about effectiveness have primarily focused on the evidence producers (e.g., researchers) instead of the evidence users (e.g., practitioners). Indeed, there is little discussion about what has been done in practice and how it relates to evidence production. We first highlight several misconceptualizations and misunderstandings contributing to this current disconnect before proposing preliminary solutions. We suggest that the definitional opacity of effectiveness and varying beliefs among stakeholders about evidentiary standards hinder progress. The paper aims to clarify concepts and offer practical solutions to improve evidence of counterterrorism effectiveness using examples and lessons learned from government-mandated evaluation practices. Substantial gains could be achieved by (a) more precisely defining and operationalizing counterterrorism objectives, (b) refining the causal modeling of counterterrorism interventions, and (c) aligning data collection practices with relevant evaluative questions of effectiveness. We conclude that effectiveness assessments need not be overly complex to be impactful. Incremental improvements may enhance the evidence available to determine (in)effectiveness.

The continuing expansion of counterterrorism has had a significant impact on human rights. However, whether such measures achieve their goals is often unclear, and their design is rarely empirically informed. In turn, counterterrorism effectiveness has failed to secure its place in the discussion of justifiability of rights’ limitations for national security purposes. This paper aims to bridge this gap and stimulate discussion on the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures among the academic, human rights, and policy-making communities.

There is a wide-ranging array of counterterrorism practices adopted in Europe. One common feature they often exhibit is the asymmetry between the certainty of their impact on rights and the uncertainty of the security gains they produce. While some government-mandated review mechanisms exist, their engagement with matters of effectiveness is often limited. Comprehensive and high-quality evaluations are rare, hindering a thorough assessment of measures’ effectiveness and impact. This demonstrates a puzzling gap between governments’ willingness to embrace counterterrorism and their efforts to scrutinise and disclose such measures’ results.

Within the field of social sciences, research on counterterrorism effectiveness remains underdeveloped compared to the substantial scholarship produced annually on radicalisation, violent extremism, and terrorism. Challenges in evaluating counterterrorism effectiveness are multifaceted, including definitional uncertainties, methodological issues, and conceptual ambiguities within the domains of counterterrorism and radicalisation. The lack of a universally accepted definition of ‘effectiveness’ related to counterterrorism hampers clear operationalization and mutual understanding among stakeholders. Ambiguities surrounding concepts like ‘radicalisation’ and ‘terrorism’ further complicate evaluations. Current research predominantly emphasizes quantifiable outcomes, such as the reduction of terrorist activity, yet often overlooks the broader implications of counterterrorism efforts, which include psychological effects and impacts on human rights. Addressing these gaps necessitates further research and theoretical innovation within the sphere of counterterrorism effectiveness.

Building on the recognised need for further exploration and theoretical advancement in counterterrorism effectiveness, our analysis illuminates certain areas necessitating additional research. Among these areas is the under-explored domain of psychological effects, which may be both deliberate, such as cultivating a sense of security, and inadvertent, including the incitement of fear within specific communities. Despite the contentious nature of these effects, it remains uncertain whether and how they should be integrated into evaluations of effectiveness. Further, there is a call for expanding the breadth of decision-making models to encapsulate not only ‘effectiveness’ in its strictest sense but also factors such as societal impacts, implications for human rights, and interactions with other policies. Our proposal for a standardised, multifaceted decision-making model strives to foster a cohesive understanding of effectiveness among various stakeholders. Lastly, we advocate for a shift in data collection and effectiveness measurement techniques, suggesting a departure from purely quantitative metrics towards adopting qualitative and innovative methods.

One key question addressed in this paper is the role that effectiveness of counterterrorism measures can play in the analysis of such measures’ justifiability in restricting the exercise of ‘limitable’ rights under human rights law. A concept central to such analysis is the ‘proportionality test’ – a doctrinal construction that consists of several sequential questions that is used to assess the justifiability of rights’ restrictions. Although typically downplayed in the academic literature, it is the ‘suitability’ or ‘rational connection’ test that can be beneficial in addressing the effectiveness of national security measures. To demonstrate this, the paper draws on the judicial reasoning by the UK Supreme Court in Bank Mellat as well as the engagement of the Israeli Supreme Court with the practice of house demolitions.

The paper then discusses the relevant case law and the approach of the European Court of Human Rights towards engaging with effectiveness of rights’ limiting measures in national security contexts. The cases surveyed demonstrate the dynamics in the Court’s reasonings created by claims about and evidence of effectiveness of rights’ limiting measures. The decisions display a variety of approaches indicating the instability in the Court’s accounting for the effectiveness of such measures, with their capacity to achieve the aims being neither central nor foreign to the Court’s engagement with them. In addressing the factors contributing to such position of effectiveness in Court’s adjudicatory practices, the paper highlights the possible inadequacy of the Court’s approach towards the proportionality test it adopts. Indeed, in lacking a coherent ‘rational connection’ subtest, the Court’s approach is not capable of systematically engaging with the question of effectiveness.

The concluding section of this paper clarifies the implications of the preceding discussion by highlighting how greater engagement with counterterrorism effectiveness in judicial review interacts with restraints of judicial deference. Indeed, judicial review alone should not be taken to overcome the existing barriers in counterterrorism review. Still, the improvement of the courts’ capacity to appropriately engage with effectiveness requires the participation of various stakeholders. The paper concludes by outlining some of the forms of such participation that are needed, as well as by highlighting the steps that would bring improvements to non-judicial counterterrorism review.

We call on the Special Rapporteur and CSOs to consider the following points a priority in future activities: (a) the need for better articulation of the goals of counter-terrorism measures, allowing CSOs to measure and scrutinise counter-terrorism impacts; (b) the necessity of achieving greater transparency and a more prominent role for CSOs in the oversight of counter-terrorism policy and measures; (c) the tendency to over-classify situations of violence involving terrorist ANSAs as armed conflicts, diluting the standards of applicable HRL; and (d) the persistence of IHL-based targeted killings that gravely threatens respect for the right to life.

Models of ethnic violence have primarily been descriptive in nature, advancing broad or particular social and political reasons as explanations, and neglecting the contributions of individuals as decision-makers. Game theoretic and rational choice models recognize the role of individual decision-making in ethnic violence. However, such models embrace a classical economic theory view of unbounded rationality as utility-maximization, with its exacting assumption of full informational access, rather than a model of bounded rationality, modeling individuals as satisficing agents endowed with evolved domain-specific competences. A newer theoretical framework hypothesizing the existence of a human coalitional psychology, an evolved domain of competence, allows us to make sense of core features of memorial narratives about ethnic violence. Qualitative data from the interviews of fifty-seven participants who were impacted by the Croatian Homeland War support expectations entailed by a coalitional psychology model of ethnic strife.

Our research brings to light features of the social world that impact moral judgments and how they do so. The moral vignette data presented were collected in rural and urban Croatian communities that were involved to varying degrees in the Croatian Homeland War. We argue that rapid shifts in moral accommodations during periods of violent social strife can be explained by considering the role that coordination and social agents' ability to reconfigure their social network (i.e., relational mobility) play in moral reasoning. Social agents coordinate on (moral) norms, a general attitude which broadly facilitates cooperation, and makes possible the collective enforcement of compliance. During social strife interested parties recalibrate their determination of others' moral standing and recast their established moral circle, in accordance with their new or prevailing social investments. To that extent, social coordination—and its particular promoters, inhibitors, and determinants—effects significant changes in individuals' ranking of moral priorities. Results indicate that rural participants evaluate the harmful actions of third parties more harshly than urban participants. Coordination mediates that relationship between social environment and moral judgment. Coordination also matters more for the moral evaluation of the harmful actions of moral scenarios involving characters belonging to different social units than for scenarios involving characters belonging to the same group. Participants high in relational mobility—that ability to recompose one's social network—moralize similarly wrongdoings perpetrated by both in- and out-group members. Those low in relational mobility differentiate when an out-group member causes the harm. Additionally, perceptions of third-party guilt are also affected by specifics of the social environment. Overall, we find that social coordination and relational mobility affect moral reasoning more so than ethnic commitment.

We explore the relationship between coalitional alignment and memories of the Croatian Homeland War. Fifty-seven Croatian citizens with war experiences participated in a semi-structured interview. Participants less affected by the war and high in ethnic commitment recalled more morally charged memories than participants low in commitment. Participants highly affected by the war similarly recalled morally charged memories; however, the qualitative nature of the memories differed between high and low commitment. Offspring of mixed marriages and Orthodox participants reported more virtuous behaviors than other participants. The findings contribute to the literature on the intractability of conflict.